

International Property Tax Institute

www.ipti.org

Property Taxation in Local Finance Reforms of Transition Countries

W. Jan Brzeski

Public Sector Finance and Accounting Working Group

Bratislava, May 15, 2008

16th NISPAcee Annual Conference 2008

International Property Tax Institute



Presentation Outline

- ❑ Economic transition and public finance reforms
- ❑ Imperative of enhanced fiscal space to finance public investments
- ❑ Intergovernmental fiscal relations and local finance
- ❑ Property taxation choices for local finance
- ❑ Specificities / challenges of property taxation in CEE countries
- ❑ Property taxation in Poland – large revenues, inefficient formula
- ❑ Points to ponder in reforming property taxation

Overriding CEE Transition Challenges

- ❑ Higher econ growth to catch up EU income levels and living standards
- ❑ Current hi growth rates still mean 15-20 years of catching up EU avg
- ❑ High growth requires more efficiency, but what about less social equity?
- ❑ Reconciling economic efficiency with social equity:
 - *low efficiency (less employment) and low equity (more poverty): Poland, Baltics, Slovakia – similar to Greece, Spain, Italy*
 - *low efficiency (less employment) and high equity (less poverty): Hungary, Slovenia, Czechia – similar to much of continental EU*
 - *high efficiency (more employment) and high equity (less poverty): Nordic countries*
- ❖ **Strategic aim for CEE is higher efficiency and higher equity economy, which requires enhanced public spending size**

Strong Public Investment Imperatives

- ❑ High and equitable growth requires huge publicly driven investments in infrastructure and human capital
- ❑ Larger fiscal space needed to finance more public investments
- ❑ Larger fiscal space is needed also for access to EU dev funds
- ❑ More investment requires additional private funds through PPP
- ❑ All investments are to improve quality and efficiency of public service delivery to the economy and society
- ❖ Better public service delivery requires sound public finance system with sufficient local autonomy and governance

Public Finance in CEE Transition

- ❑ Assignment of roles betw State and local gov (decentralization) +
- ❑ Assignment of roles among various local government levels
- ❑ Intergovernmental finance to fund the reassigned roles
- ❑ Mechanisms for mobilizing revenues from physical and legal persons
- ❑ Mobilizing aid funding from donor countries and institutions
- ❑ Interacting with capital markets for public debt financing through loans and bonds – need for creditworthiness
- ❑ Citizen oversight over public spending and political accountability
- ❖ **Public finance reform strategy: rationalizing expenditures and improving revenue mobilization to create larger fiscal space**

Pros and Cons of Decentralization

- Advantages of decentralization:
 - *Better match supply/demand of public services*
 - *More efficient and effective service provision*
 - *Increased political stability*
- Disadvantages of decentralization:
 - *Aggravations of spatial / geographic disparities*
 - *Less efficient budgetary macro-economic management*
 - *Higher fixed costs of territorial administration*
 - *Risk of local regulatory capture and expenditure indiscipline*
- ❖ **Weak correlation between decentralization and economic growth**

Challenge of Larger Fiscal Space

- *Def:* „budgetary room that allows government to provide funds for desired purpose without threat to sustainability of its financial position”
- Capacity risk of govt’s limited absorptive capacity for additional, productive public spending (too much money)
- EU - need for fiscal deficit < 3% GDP, and debt levels < 60% GDP
- Already compressed social spending confronting aging population
- Fiscal space can expand mostly via less public spending (social insur)
- ❖ Reducing deficit through investment cuts is politically easier, but compromises prospects of sustainable economic growth

Potential for Expanding Fiscal Space

- ❑ Countries with large public sectors can reduce wasteful spending
- ❑ Fiscal space can increase by broadening of tax bases and sources
- ❑ Reduce social transfers, health, education, public administration
- ❑ Better tax administration reduces costs and increases net revenues
- ❑ Privatization of public enterprises reduces fiscal subsidies
- ❑ Leveraging scarce public funds through public-private partnerships
- ❑ Strengthening public finance management (procurement, debt, ...)
- ❑ Deficit financing through debt issuance at capital market (loans, bonds)
- ❖ **Broader tax base and tax sources – the way to expand fiscal space**

Inter-governmental Fiscal Relations

- ❑ More reliance on social contribution and indirect taxes, as heavy income taxation hampers stronger economic growth
- ❑ Subnational finance important part of public finance – 20-25%
- ❑ Subnational share in GDP varies: SK 3%, H 13%, PL 15.5%
- ❑ Subnational debt around 2% GDP in PL vs. 10-20% GDP in EU
- ❑ Local budgets more balanced under tight borrowing constraints
- ❑ Local social services = health, education, social assistance
- ❑ Local infrastructure = water, sanitation, heat, waste, transport, streets
- ❑ Functional decentralization requires more local revenues, but ...
- ❑ Local fiscal autonomy could undercut State fiscal and equity objectives
- ❖ **Local governments need own revenue sources not competing with State revenues and do not discourage economic growth**

Local Government Revenues

- Discretionary and dedicated local government funding
 - *Shared revenues + local taxes, fees, charges*
 - *Dedicated funding mostly to health and education*
 - *Shared revenues mostly on income taxation*
 - *No major unrestricted tax base to local governments*
 - *Problems with easy access to capital market debt financing in 1990s*
 - *Imposition of prudential limits on local borrowing and debt service*
 - *State bailouts in most countries, some have bankruptcy law – H, LV, SK*
- Directions for further local finance reform:
 - *Fine-tuning of inter-governmental transfer system; and/or*
 - *Local gov'ts decide on expenditure level and own-source funding (PIT); and/or*
 - *States retain total tax policy control, „locals” not eager to impose own taxes*
- ❖ **Many local governments still try to avoid the onus of own taxation (and accountability) and prefer the State to retain full tax policy control**

Property Taxation Choices

- Variety of formulas from area-based to full *ad valorem*
- Advantages of *ad valorem* model of property taxation:
 - *Revenue buoyancy*
 - *Locally carried tax burden*
 - *Not regressive*
 - *Taxes tangible benefits*
 - *Positive land use efficiency effects*
- Disadvantages of *ad valorem* model of property taxation:
 - *Little revenue if improper rates and poor coverage*
 - *Difficult and costly administration*
 - *Judgmental assessment*
 - *Taxes unrealized income*
 - *Highly visible to taxpayers*
 - *Difficult to enforce*

Calibrating Area Basis to the Market

- ❑ Area basis persisting in many transition economies
- ❑ Some countries moving to market calibrated area basis – Gujarat (India) shifting away from rental values to calibrated „carpet area”
- ❑ Some market countries continue with area basis
- ❑ Market calibration of area basis on the way to full CVS
- ❑ Political perception and admin simplicity of area basis provide strong appeal to taxpayers and tax administrators
- ❑ Objective and simple measurement vs. subjective estimation
- ❑ Gradual market calibration to area basis might be the way
- ❖ *Unit value area basis a compromise – “market calibrated simplicity”*

Specificities of CE economies

- ❑ No land and real estate markets for long time
- ❑ High incidence of income-poor asset-rich taxpayers
- ❑ Subject (taxpayer) based property taxation systems
- ❑ Non-value tax base in property taxation
- ❑ Little tradition of wealth taxation of individuals
- ❑ Significant grey sector evading income taxation
- ❑ Big potential non-fiscal benefits from better land use
- ❑ Big potential non-fiscal benefits from equity / efficiency
- ❖ **Difficult to move to ad valorem reforms due to political economic concerns and impediments**

Problems with CEE Property Tax Reforms

- ❑ Administrators happy with area based
- ❑ Local politicians wary of direct accountability
- ❑ *Ad valorem* is expensive and needs robust revenues
- ❑ Businesses are “rich” and people are “poor”
- ❑ Equity not an issue when small tax is seen as a “fee”
- ❑ Low taxes already capitalized into high property values
- ❑ Institutional / professional infighting for running *ad valorem*
- ❑ Inequality between “rich” and “poor cities”
- ❑ Worrying about asset-rich but income-poor households
- ❑ Inconsistent experience in Western countries
- ❑ Little market evidence in smaller cities and towns
- ❖ Focus should be set on weaknesses of the existing formula

Local Real Property Taxation in CEE

- ❑ Most widespread form of local revenue is property tax
- ❑ Market calibrated taxes often do not produce high revenues
- ❑ Significance of property tax revenues varies widely:
 - *Poland: 1.4% GDP*
 - *Latvia: 0.9% GDP*
 - *Lithuania: 0.5% GDP; Estonia: 0.4% GDP; Slovakia: 0.4% GDP*
 - *Hungary and Czech: 0.2% GDP; Slovenia: less than 0.2% GDP*
- ❑ Definitions of property tax base vary widely
- ❑ Local discretion over tax rates and tax relief varies widely
- ❑ Billing, collection and enforcement varies widely
- ❑ Political economy - main reform impediment in some countries
- ❖ *Local revenues need to grow, but own sources from business taxation and privatization are drying up, with State not willing to transfer more*

Role of Property Taxation in Poland

COUNTRY	Property taxes relative to the economy: GDP	Property taxes: share of government revenues	Property taxes: share of total local revenues	Property taxes: share of local autonomous revenues
Poland	1,2 %	3,0 %	13,9 %	31,8 %
Average for the CE	0,6 %	1,7 %	8,1 %	15,3 %
Average for the EU	0,9 %	2,2 %	7,3 %	32,5 %

Features of the Polish Property Tax (1)

- Residential tax kept at minimal levels:
 - *home 120 m² on 400 m² parcel pays 21 USD in 4 installments*
- Business tax 35 times higher than residential
- Business buildings yield 50% revenue, but store 5% value
- Residential buildings store 70% value, but yield 10% rev.
- Effective taxation in *ad valorem* equivalent:
 - *business use buildings: 7.8% of capital value*
 - *business use land: 1.4% of capital value*
 - *residential use buildings: 0.062% of capital value*
 - *residential use land: 0.046% of capital value*
- Land rates 8 times smaller than building rates
- Land use efficiency is low and riddled with speculation

Property Tax Trends in Poland (2)

- ❑ Self assessment by businesses
- ❑ Businesses pay lion's share of property tax revenues
 - *Business buildings yield 50% revenue, but store 5% of value base*
 - *Residential buildings store 70% value base, but yield 10% revenue*
- ❑ Incomplete coverage:
- ❑ Numerous exemptions and rebates
- ❑ No PR or taxpayer education activities
- ❑ Tax bills full of threats rather than encouragements
- ❑ High residential compliance, few appeals
- ❖ **Tax administrators and voting taxpayers not looking for change**

Some Points to Ponder

- “Ineffective” ad valorem vs. “effective” area-based
 - *from ineffective rental value to market calibrated carpet area – India*
 - *from subject based area to market calibrated cadastral area – Poland*
 - ❖ **Perhaps market calibrated area based system is optimal as first phase**
- Tax formula for small / rural vs. large / urban jurisdictions
 - *little value differentiation makes it cost-ineffective to use ad valorem*
 - ❖ **Perhaps jurisdictions could make a choice about tax base formula**
- Contribution from business vs. residential properties
 - *businesses often contribute the most of property tax revenues*
 - *most of valuation efforts often given to residential properties*
 - ❖ **Perhaps more focus on valuing business properties**

Some Points to Ponder (2)

- Point of departure for the reforms
 - *In Poland the reform initially driven by praising ad valorem virtues*
 - *In India the reform initially driven by poor collection of ad valorem*
 - ❖ **Start with solving the problems of the existing system**

- New tax or modification of the existing
 - *In Poland modification easier to sell to tax administrators and public*
 - *In India new tax easier to sell to public (equitable, rational)*
 - ❖ **Political economy decides on packaging and marketing**
 - ❖ **Market calibration, revenue collection, or both ?**

Local Revenues in Krakow - Poland

- Own-source revenues constituted 36.75% total revenues
 - *Property tax: 14.39 %*
 - *Other own taxes and fees: 1.86 %*
 - *Local taxes/fees collected by gov't tax offices: 3.21%*
 - *Income from fixed assets: 7.48 %*
 - *Liquor concessions: 0.62 %*
 - *Other own-source revenues: 9.19 %*
- Government transfers constituted 61.07 % of total revenues:
 - *Share in government budget revenue: 27.46 %*
 - *Subsidies and grants (general, dedicated): 33.61%*
- Foreign source grants: 2.18%

Thank you!

IPTI at www.ipti.org

International Property Tax Institute
100 Sheppard Ave. East
Suite 760
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M2N 6N5
(416) 228-8874
(416) 224-1163
ipti@ipti.org

International Property Tax Institute